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This paper analyzes the distribution of staff resources between party faces. While earlier studies 
have compared central – and parliamentary offices, this study also includes ministerial offices. To 
fully capture the differences in staffing, I examine both the quantity (staff size) and quality 
(education, experience, tasks) of their staffs. The empirical section is based on a cross-sectional 
analysis of original survey data collected among political staffers in Belgium and the Netherlands 
(N=1009). While the Belgian cabinet system includes extensive ministerial offices, ministerial staff 
is limited in the Dutch non-cabinet system. The results show how this institutional difference 
shapes the internal distribution of resources. While the party in parliament does not have a clear 
staffing advantage over the party in central office in Belgium, they are both eclipsed by the large, highly 
qualified party in government. In the Netherlands, the impact of ministerial offices is negligible and 
the staff of the party in parliament is both larger and more qualified than the staff of the party in central 
office.  
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The impact of professionalization on the internal power balance of parties lies at the heart of 
influential party models (Panebianco, 1988; Katz and Mair, 1995; Hopkin and Paolucci, 1999). The 
growing presence of professional staffers is often seen as an organizational game changer, 
empowering elected elites at the expense of extra-parliamentary party organizations (Katz and Mair, 
2002). This paper aims to contribute to this debate by comparing the staff resources of 
parliamentary – and ministerial offices to those of central offices. If the human resources of central 
offices are indeed inferior, the staffing advantage of parliamentary – and ministerial offices 
undermines the capacity of extra-parliamentary party organizations to control their elected elites. 
This matters because central offices have a crucial role as mouthpieces of a party members and 
activists: they safeguard parties’ ideological principles and long-term policy goals while elected elites 
are immersed in day-to-day politics (Gibson and Harmel, 1998).  
Existing empirical studies have analyzed quantitative evolutions, showing how the size of 
parliamentary offices has surpassed central offices in Western Europe (Krouwel, 2012; Bardi et al., 
2017). However, two elements are currently missing from the discussion. Firstly, the actual 
qualifications of staffers merit closer examination. Building on the seminal work of Panebianco 
(1988), I argue that staffers’ individual qualifications can amplify or reduce the staffing advantage 
of parliamentary – and ministerial offices. While a larger staff indicates a quantitative staffing 
advantage, a more highly qualified staff signals a qualitative staffing advantage. Secondly, the party 
in public office should not be reduced to the party in parliament as ministerial offices can strongly affect 
the distribution of staff resources. Ministerial staffers are an integral part of parties’ human 
resources as they are most often recruited through the party network (Moens, 2020). Therefore, 
this study introduces a more fine-grained approach by disaggregating the party in public office into the 
party in parliament and the party in government.  
This paper addresses two research questions. I first examine which party face has both the largest 
(quantitative advantage) and most qualified staff (qualitative advantage). Hence, the first research 
question: ‘Which party face benefits from a double staffing advantage: the party in central office, the 
party in parliament or the party in government (RQ1)?’ Based earlier research on parties’ internal  
distribution of resources, I expect that parties’ central office staff is smaller and less qualified than 
those working in parliamentary – and ministerial offices. However, I suggest that institutional 
factors determine whether the party in parliament or the party in government reaps the benefits of this 
double staffing advantage. Based on recent studies of ministerial advisors (Shaw and Eichbaum, 




on the institutional context. For this reason, I compare the Belgian cabinet system (extensive 
ministerial offices) to the Dutch system (small ministerial offices) to address the second research 
question: How does the size of ministerial offices affect the quantitative and qualitative staff 
distribution within political parties (RQ2)?  
Political staffers are under-researched and gaining access to this notoriously elusive population is 
challenging (Webb and Kolodny, 2006). As a result, only a few studies have focused on their 
individual characteristics (Webb and Fisher, 2003; Karlsen and Saglie, 2017) and longitudinal 
analyses on the micro-level are beyond our reach. Instead, this paper focuses on the current state 
of affairs in Belgium and the Netherlands based on original survey data collected among the staff 
of 14 parties (N=1009). It offers an in depth, cross-sectional analysis of staffing by analyzing both 
its quantitative dimension (staff size) and qualitative dimension (staffers’ qualifications). The 
quantitative dimension is studied by comparing the relative staff sizes of central – , parliamentary 
– and ministerial offices. The qualitative dimension is studied by analyzing the individual expertise 
of staffers from different party faces, including their education, professional experience and tasks.  
This paper makes two innovative contributions to existing literature. Firstly, the full scope of 
parties’ national human capital is rarely studied in depth. Whereas most existing studies focus on a 
specific subgroup of staffers within a specific party face such as ministerial advisors (Shaw and 
Eichbaum, 2018) or parliamentary staff (Hertel-Fernandez et al., 2018), I approach political staffers 
as a single group spread across several entities (central office, parliament, government). Secondly, 
the paper demonstrates how institutional factors can affect the internal working of political parties. 
The differences between Belgium and the Netherlands suggest that staffing might affect party 
organizations similarly in other political systems. Moreover, the impact of ministerial cabinets has 
broader relevance as ministerial advisors are becoming increasingly prominent in several political 
systems (Gouglas and Brans, 2017).  
This paper proceeds as follows. First, I discuss the power relation between party faces and how it 
is linked to the distribution of human resources. After theorizing the quantitative and qualitative 
staffing advantage of parliamentary – and ministerial offices, the systemic differences between 
Belgium and the Netherlands are addressed. The methods section specifies data collection, the 
operationalization of key variables and on the empirical analysis. Consequently, I analyze the 
combined effect of staff size and staffers’ qualifications (education, professional experience and 
tasks) to assess the uneven distribution of staff. Lastly, the implications of this staffing advantage 




Professionalization and Power 
In their seminal conceptualization of political parties, Katz and Mair (1993) distinguish between 
three faces of party organization: the party on the ground (members and activists), the party in central 
office (national party organization) and the party in public office (parliament and government). 
Moreover, they argued that this distinction was essential to understanding an internal power shift 
within parties because the party in public office had become the dominant force within contemporary 
parties (Katz and Mair, 1993; Katz and Mair, 2002). Katz and Mair’s claims continue to inspire 
research on the growing importance of the party in public office, including debates on the 
presidentialization (Poguntke and Webb, 2007; Passarelli, 2015) and personalization (McAllister, 
2007; Rahat and Kenig, 2018). Similarly, the impact of cartelization on the party on the ground is 
subject to ongoing debate among scholars (Van Biezen and Poguntke, 2014; Heidar and Wauters, 
2019; Loxbo, 2013). However,  this paper aims to shed light on the relationship between the party 
in central office and the party in public office (Gibson and Harmel, 1998; Van Biezen, 2000). 




Koskimaa (2020) identifies three dimensions that shape the power balance between parties’ central 
– and public offices: control of resources, leadership positions and statutory prerogatives. Instead 
of examining all of these power dimensions, this paper takes a closer look at one particular resource: 
staff. Evidently, this focus implies that the complete staff of parties’ central – and public offices 
should be taken into account. Hence, I define this population of political staffers as “individuals with 
remunerated, unelected positions that have been politically recruited within a party office, parliamentary party group 
or ministerial office” (Moens, 2020). This approach to political staff is quite innovative as staffers from 
different party faces have barely been analyzed as a single population. Existing research is scattered 
across disciplines interested in specific subgroups of staffers. Firstly, legislative scholars have 
focused on parliamentary staffers’ impact on political representation, most notably the US congress 
(Patterson, 1970; DeGregorio, 1988; Salisbury and Shepsle, 1981; McCrain, 2018; Hertel-
Fernandez et al., 2018) and the European parliament (Busby and Belkacem, 2013; Pegan, 2017). 
Secondly, public administration scholars have focused on the policy advice of ministerial staffers 
(Maley, 2000; Brans, 2017) and the (dys)functions of ministerial offices, particularly in relation to 
civil servants (Connaughton, 2015).  
While party politics scholars have rarely studied political staff, the few existing studies neglect 
ministerial staffers and limit their scope to staffers in central – and parliamentary offices. This 
observation applies to both in-depth studies focusing on staffers as individuals (Webb and Fisher, 
2003; Karlsen and Saglie, 2017) as well as large-N analyses of their increasing presence in parties 
(Katz and Mair, 1993; Krouwel, 2012; Bardi et al., 2017). However, I argue that ministerial staffers 
should not be overlooked as they are an integral part of a party’s human resources. Admittedly, 
parties often only directly pay central office staffers (Webb and Kolodny, 2006). Yet the mere 
concept of the party in public office clearly implies that a party’s human capital extends beyond its 
own payroll. While the salary of elites in parliament and government originates from the state, 
parties are nonetheless indirectly responsible for their compensation because they are the principal 
recruitment channel for such positions (Schlesinger, 1984; Jun and Bukow, 2020). As pointed out 
by Katz and Mair (1993), “the resources of the party in public office may not be visible in pure party terms, 
especially when the party in question includes a governing as well as a parliamentary face, and when key staff are 
appointed to positions in the public, as opposed to the party, bureaucracy” (Katz and Mair, 1993: 606). To 
allow for a more fine-grained assessment of parties’ internal distribution of staff, this paper 
distinguishes between three party faces: the party in central office, the party in parliament and the party 
in government.  
The conventional wisdom among party scholars is that professionalization has strengthened the 




show that the influx of paid staffers has disproportionally benefitted the party in parliament (Katz 
and Mair, 1993; Krouwel, 2012; Kölln, 2015; Bardi et al., 2017). More specifically, staff growth 
within parliamentary offices has simply outpaced central offices. Whereas central offices originally 
had larger staffs than parliamentary offices in most parties during the 1970s, the opposite had 
become the case by the 2010s (Bardi et al., 2017). Although both party faces have professionalized 
ostensibly, these analyses suggest that professionalization has put the party in parliament in control 
of the majority of parties’ human resources. However, I argue that a full assessment of a party’s 
human resources should a) consider the actual qualifications of staffers and b) include ministerial 
offices in the analysis.  
Two dimensions of Staffing 
The relationship between parties’ central – , parliamentary – and ministerial offices is shaped by 
both the quantity – and quality of staffers. Including this qualitative dimension of staffing is 
important because professionalization goes well beyond staff size. Panebianco’s original argument 
(1988) strongly focused on staffers’ individual qualifications as it described the gradual replacement 
of traditional party bureaucrats by more qualified professionals. Building on the seminal work of 
Panebianco (1988) and Katz and Mair (2002), I expect that the influx of these political professionals 
puts the party in central office at a double disadvantage. Public offices do not only have larger 
staffs, the individual qualifications of their staffers reinforce their dominance over the party in 
central office.  
The principal difference between these professionals and traditional bureaucrats is their role within 
politics. Panebianco (1988) drew from private sector terminology by referring to the different 
assignments of employees with line – and staff roles. Whereas traditional bureaucrats exemplified 
the line role in politics by supporting the party machine as administrative clerks, political 
professionals take on advice-oriented roles towards elected elites. More recently, Karlsen and Saglie 
(2017) have applied Panebianco’s work to the current context by distinguishing between staffers 
with technical – and strategic tasks. “Strategy assistance refers to involvement in essentially political decisions, 
such as the development and implementation of policy and campaign strategy. Technical assistance includes 
administrative functions and services, such as website design or maintaining membership files” (Karlsen and Saglie, 
2017: 4). Hence, the overrepresentation of political-strategic staffers within a the party in public office 
signals a qualitative advantage. 
The dominance of political-strategic staffers within parties’ public offices reduces the capacity of 
central offices to control the party in public office. As Panebianco (1988), described the power 




susceptible to control, I expect that staffers’ professional expertise plays a central role in this 
process. Knowledge is power: staffers with extensive expertise have an informational advantage 
over political competitors, colleagues and elected elites. Firstly, such expertise can be accrued 
through education. Secondly, the most valuable expertise is accumulated through professional 
experience, as ‘professional knowledge is obtained by practice, by an apprenticeship process or ‘enculturation 
process’; an unwritten know-how or ‘tacit knowledge’ that cannot be standardized and formalized to a university 
course’ (Brante, 1990: 83-84). Both experience inside – and outside of politics can translate into an 
informational advantage. Those with extensive experience in politics excel at “knowing the game” 
(Svallfors, 2017), remaining one step ahead of others who are less familiar with political dynamics. 
Those with extensive experience outside politics (civil service, academia, private sector) specialize 
within specific policy domains or communication practices – including details that escape political 
generalists.  
Why does all this expertise disproportionally benefit public offices? While the quantitative 
advantage of the party in public office is caused by their privileged access to state resources, I suggest 
that the qualitative advantage of parties’ public offices is the result of environmental pressures. The 
party in public office has been at the forefront professionalization because elected elites 
(representatives and ministers) experience several environmental challenges more acutely. In the 
electoral arena, elected elites faced increased competition and volatility (Drummond, 2006) due to 
centripetal competition (Kircheimer, 1966) and the success of challenger parties (De Vries and 
Hobolt, 2020). At the same time, the emergence of mass media (and later: social media) provided 
new opportunities to connect with voters. As a result, communication experts were recruited to 
navigate new technological developments and strengthen their position towards media outlets in 
this permanent campaign environment (Blumenthal, 1980). In the policy arena, elected elites faced 
increasing complexity fueled by the expanding welfare states and the growing importance of multi-
level governance (Marks et al., 1996). At the same time, interest groups (Allern, 2012), lobbyists 
(McCrain, 2018) and think tanks (Stone et al., 1998) increasingly sought access to elites to shape 
policies. As a result, policy experts were hired to navigate the increasingly complex and technical 
nature of policy-making. Admittedly, central offices are not immune to environmental challenges. 
However, I argue that the fate of the party in public office is affected more directly to its performance 
within the electoral – and policy arena. As a result, elected elites in parliament and government 
have a higher need for in-house expertise.  
H1: The staff of parliamentary – and ministerial offices is both larger and more 




Although earlier studies show that parties’ public offices have a quantitative staffing advantage over 
central offices, this supposed qualitative advantage remains untested. Moreover, parties’ internal 
distribution of staff is actually more complicated because the party in public office often includes both 
parliamentary – and ministerial offices. Therefore, a complete assessment of staffing requires that 
central offices, parliamentary offices and ministerial offices are situated on two separate, 
independent dimensions of staffing. To situate party faces on both dimensions, I distinguish 
between 4 types of  party faces: professional machines, back-offices, expert cells and bureaucracies 
(Figure 2). While the quantitative dimension distinguishes between party faces with larger and 
smaller staffs, the qualitative dimensions distinguishes between party faces  with highly qualified 
and less qualified staff. 
Figure 2: Quantitative and Qualitative dimension of Staffing 
Professional machines are dominant party faces with an extensive, highly qualified staff. In contrast, 
back-offices with a small, less qualified staff inevitably play a secondary role. Yet both cases reflect 
the conventional perspective staff distribution: party faces take similar positions on the quantitative 
– and qualitative dimension. When quantity and quality do not run parallel, however, party faces 
can be categorized as expert cells (small, highly qualified staff) or bureaucracies (large, less qualified 
staff). In these cases, the internal position of party faces is more ambiguous. One the one hand, 
the high degree of expertise might partially compensate for the limited staff size of expert cells. On 
other hand, bureaucracies might be less dominant than suggested by their staff size due to the low 





The institutional setting in which parties operate determines which particular public office reaps 
the benefits of this staffing advantage. In most Western European parliamentary democracies, 
staffing puts parties’ central offices at a double disadvantage. However, the party in public office is not 
monolithic and its institutional structure varies considerably between political systems. I argue that 
the institutional setting determines whether the party in parliament or the party in government benefits 
from a staffing advantage. Depending on the structure of the core executive within a political 
system, ministerial staffers can tilt the staffing advantage of the party in public office in favor of the 
party in government. In nations within the Napoleonic‡ administrative tradition, members of 
government are supported by an extensive cabinet containing dozens of partisan staffers serving a 
single minister (Gouglas et al., 2015; Ongaro and Peters, 2008).  
In ministerial cabinet systems, I expect that the sheer size of these ministerial offices translates into 
a temporary staffing advantage within the party in government. As a consequence, a party’s internal 
distribution of human resources hinges on its governing status. Whereas majority parties control 
the government resources needed to recruit numerous ministerial staffers, they lose this privilege 
when leaving government and the party in parliament becomes the main foothold for staffers. 
Regardless of entering government or dropping out, the transition of power automatically triggers 
a restructuring of parties’ human resources. These recurring cycles of organizational expansion and 
contraction align with Bolleyer’s description of the cartel party’s inherent vulnerabilities (2009), as 
parties’ reliance on controlling of government resources leads to organizational instability. In non-
cabinet systems, ministerial advisors are not numerous enough to fundamentally shift parties’ 
internal balance of human resources towards its ministerial offices (Ng, 2018; Shaw and Eichbaum, 
2018). In such political systems, the staffing advantage of the party in public office remains 
permanently concentrated within the party in parliament (Wilson, 2020).  
H2a: In ministerial cabinet systems, ministerial offices benefit from a 
staffing advantage when a party participates in government. 
H2b: In ministerial cabinet systems, parliamentary offices benefit from a 
staffing advantage when a party does not participate in government. 
H2c: In non-cabinet systems, parliamentary offices benefit from a 
permanent staffing advantage. 
                                                          




Case-selection and method 
This study examines staffers from Belgium and the Netherlands. From an international perspective, 
both countries share many similarities. Both are historically divided societies which have overcome 
societal cleavages through consociationalism and power-sharing (Deschouwer, 2009; Andeweg and 
Irwin, 2009). Their highly proportional electoral systems have produced extensive, complex party 
systems that require cooperation through coalition government. In both countries, this institutional 
context has created collective staff infrastructures centered around parties, who predominantly 
recruit staffers within their own network (Moens, 2020). As such, this comparative study controls 
for the potential impact of consociationalism and a multi-party context. However, the systemic 
differences between both nations concern a key argument of this paper: the impact of ministerial 
cabinets. As Belgium and the Netherlands adhere to different administrative traditions (Painter and 
Peters, 2010), the institutional support structures for governments are fundamentally different 
(Brans et al., 2006). As a member of the European continental tradition, impartial civil servants 
provide the most important policy advice to Dutch ministers as they are only assisted by a handful 
of political staffers. As a member of the Napoleonic tradition, an extensive team of partisan ‘cabinet 
advisors’ provide the most important policy advice to Belgian ministers and distrust fuels the 
marginalization of a politicized civil service (De Winter and Brans, 2003).  
Data collection 
Original survey data were collected among the paid staff of fourteen parties (Appendix A). Since 
the support of party leadership was indispensable for contacting the target population, face-to-face 
interviews with senior party management were set up to gain an official endorsement. Although 
parties are often reluctant to provide access to their personnel (Webb and Kolodny, 2006; Webb 
and Keith, 2017), this approach resulted in the participation of 14 out of 25 parties represented in 
the Belgian and Dutch parliaments. Apart from the radical right family (which refused to 
participate), these cases mirror the diversity of the party landscape in electoral size, organizational 
resources and ideological outlook. Before launching the online survey, a carefully-developed 
questionnaire was tested among party staffers during 33 face-to-face interviews.  
Designed to be completed in under 15 minutes, the questionnaire contained general background 
questions on staffers' sociodemographic characteristics, day-to-day professional activities and 
previous professional experiences, but also gauged their political attitudes, future ambitions and 
their interactions with peers and elected elites. Between December 2018 and January 2020, the 




this online questionnaire, followed up by two reminders. Out of a population of 2936 individuals, 
the survey obtained a response rate of 34% (N=1009). To calculate response rates and check the 
representativeness of our findings, participating parties provided population data. Based on the 
weighted cases approach (Parke, 2012), X2-tests were run to test under – or overrepresentation 
among specific subgroups within the sample. Post-stratification weights were calculated based on 
population data on the number of staffers within each party, party face and age category (weighting 
factors range from 0,63 to 1,37).  
Variables and analysis 
The analysis examines staffers’ qualifications based on three indicators: their education, 
professional experience and tasks. Firstly, their formal education gives us an impression of their 
expertise. Staffers were categorized into three groups based on the highest degree they have 
obtained: no higher education, higher non-college and college degree. Secondly, their actual 
professional experience will also be examined as ‘professional knowledge is obtained by practice, by an 
apprenticeship process or ‘enculturation process’; an unwritten know-how or ‘tacit knowledge’ that cannot be 
standardized and formalized to a university course’ (Brante, 1990: 83-84). Professional experience was 
measured using 6-point Likert scales§ surveying their prior experience in a given field, e.g. the 
public sector. Consequently, these scales were recoded into dichotomous variables to identify 
staffers with substantial experience (at least 10 years of experience). In effect, only staffers who 
have experienced at least two political cycles are considered as ‘experienced in party politics’. The 
same operationalization was applied to experience outside party politics. Thirdly, I analyze what 
staffers actually do by considering their individual tasks. Based on their principal activities, staffers 
were grouped into 6 mutually exclusive categories: managers, policy experts, communication 
experts, political assistants, party organizers and administration & support. While a high prevalence 
of political-strategic staffers (policy – and communication experts) contributes to a qualitative 
advantage, a high prevalence of staffers with traditional bureaucratic tasks (party organizers and 
administration & support) contributes to a qualitative disadvantage. 
The prevalence of these indicators show interesting commonalities and differences between 
Belgium and the Netherlands (Table 1). Firstly, staffers from both countries are highly-educated. 
College graduates make up the lion share of all staffers: only a small minority did not receive a 
higher education. Secondly, staffers’ professional experiences are mostly centered around party 
politics. In both countries, the most common occupational track is political and only a minority of 
                                                          
§ 1 = no experience, 2 = a few months, 3 = several years, 4 = more than 5 years, 5 = more than 10 years, 6 = more 




staffers has extensive professional experience in the public – or private sector. Nonetheless, 
Belgium and The Netherlands diverge significantly as Belgian staffers have distinctly more 
experience in both party politics and the public sector. This is likely driven by differences in age, 
as Dutch political staffers are often younger than their Belgian counterparts. Whereas staffers’ 
median age is 32,5 in The Netherlands, it is 40 in Belgium (Appendix C). Thirdly, around half of 
all staffers have political-strategic tasks (policy – or communication expert) and some 20% have 
classic bureaucratic tasks (party organizer, administration). Strikingly, the balance between policy – 
and communication experts is significantly different: whereas communication experts are more 
prevalent in The Netherlands, Belgian parties include more policy experts. In both cases however, 
political-strategic staffers are not an overwhelming majority. 








Educationa       
   No higher education 14% 11% 13% 
   Higher, non-college  18% 19% 18% 
   College degree 69% 70% 69% 
 
Professional experienceb       
   Party Politics      31% **      19% ** 30% 
   Public sector        22% ***         6% *** 21% 
   Private sector  14% 12% 14% 
 
Tasksa     
  
   Manager 8% 8% 8% 
   Policy expert   41% *   30% * 40% 
   Communication expert     12% **     22% ** 13% 
   Political assistant   17% °   24% ° 18% 
   Party organizer 6% 6% 6% 
   Administration & support 15% 11% 15% 
    
a: categories mutually exclusive, b: categories not mutually exclusive 
Adjusted stand. residuals: ° p ≤ .1, * p ≤ .05, ** p ≤ .01, *** p ≤ .001 
 
The results section undertakes several analytical steps. Firstly, the quantitative dimension of staffing 
is examined by comparing the relative staff size of central – , parliamentary – and ministerial offices 
in Belgium and the Netherlands. This categorization between party faces is based on a survey 




activities. Secondly, a bivariate analysis addresses the qualitative dimension of staffing by describing 
the prevalence of three indicators (education, experience and tasks) across the different party faces. 
Significance levels were determined based on adjusted standardized residuals (° p ≤ .1, * p ≤ .05, 
** p ≤ .01, *** p ≤ .001). To complement this bivariate analysis of staffers’ individual qualifications, 
two additional regression analyses were ran to a) identify which types of staffers are most likely to 
work within specific party faces and b) identify which types of individuals tasks are linked to higher 
levels of education and professional experience. These models control for age and sex as education 
and professional experience are expected to be influenced by age and existing studies have shown 
that staffers’ relationship to parties is gendered (Taflaga and Kerby, 2019; Snagovsky and Kerby, 
2018; Calcagno and Montgomery, 2020; Erikson and Verge, 2020). Thirdly, a bivariate analysis 
examines the impact of ministerial offices on staffing by comparing the distribution of qualified 
staffers in government – and opposition parties. By taking the staff size of party faces as a 
benchmark, chi-square tests with adjusted standardized residuals** were ran to examine whether 
the qualitative dimension amplifies or reduces the quantitative dimension.  
Results 
To examine which party face benefits from a double staffing advantage (RQ1), two steps will be 
undertaken. Firstly, I analyze the relative staff size of parties’ central – , parliamentary – and 
ministerial offices (quantitative dimension). Secondly, I examine which party faces have the most 
qualified staff by analyzing their level of education, professional experience and their individual 
tasks (qualitative dimension).  
Quantitative dimension 
The quantitative staff distribution shows that Belgian and Dutch political staffers are not 
distributed evenly across all party faces. However, different party faces reap the benefits from this 
unequal distribution in Belgium and the Netherlands (Figure 3). The Dutch case reflects 
conventional wisdom on contemporary parties: a clear majority of all Dutch staffers are 
concentrated within parliament. In contrast, the Belgian case demonstrates how the party in 
government can be the main beneficiary of a quantitative staffing advantage: the majority of Belgian 
staffers work in ministerial offices. The sheer size of these extensive ministerial ‘cabinets’ pushes 
back the relative weight of central – and parliamentary offices. As a result, Dutch central offices 
house a larger share of their party’s human resources than their Belgian counterparts. However, 
this does not mean that Dutch central offices have larger staffs in absolute terms. In general, the 
                                                          








Figure 3: Quantitative staff distribution  
Qualitative dimension 
The individual qualifications of staffers demonstrate that highly qualified staffers are indeed more 
prevalent within the party in parliament and the party in government. In Belgium, especially ministerial 
offices benefit from a qualitative staffing advantage (Table 2). Belgian ministerial staffers stand out 
for their professional experience and their tasks. While all party faces include a similar portion of 
staffers with experience in party politics, ministerial staffers bring in significantly more extra-
political experience. The difference is especially striking for experience within the public sector, 
which shows that ministerial offices are an important gateway between politics and the civil service 
in Belgium. The qualitative staffing advantage of Belgian ministerial offices is also illustrated by the 
many policy experts among their ranks. Although not unique to the party in government, policy experts 
make up the majority of ministerial staffers. Their presence is significantly lower in other party 
faces.  
However, the qualitative advantage of Belgian ministerial offices is not absolute. Firstly, the 
qualitative advantage of the party in government is tempered by the lack of an educational advantage. 
Although staffers are well-educated in general (Table 1), parliamentary staffers are actually more 
likely to hold a university degree than their colleagues at ministerial offices. This comparatively low 
level of education among ministerial staffers is linked to the presence of staffers in administrative 
– and supportive roles, as staffers within this category are significantly less likely to be higher-
educated (Appendix E). In contrast, this group is virtually absent in parliamentary offices. 
Unsurprisingly, both the level of education and the prevalence of administration and support 
staffers at central – and ministerial offices are highly similar. Secondly, the qualitative advantage of 
the party in government is tempered by the low presence of communication experts. In fact, 
communication experts are most numerous at parties’ central offices. However, these nuances do 




















       
   No higher education    18% °         6% ***    16% *        26% ***   4% 0% 
   Higher, non-college education 18% 17% 18%  26% 16% 0% 
   College degree 64%       78% ***    67% °        47% ***    79% * 100% 
 
Professional experience 
      
 
   Party politics 30% 31% 32%  16% 20% 25% 
   Public sector       7% *** 9% ***       35% ***  9% 3% 25% 
   Private sector  12% 12%    17% *  9% 11% 25% 
 
Tasks  
    
   
   Manager 8% 7%    9%    3% 11% 0% 
   Policy expert      17% ***      30% ***        55% ***      14% **       41% *** 0% 
   Communication expert      21% ***       5% *** 13%  25% 21% 0% 
   Political assistant       7% ***      54% ***         4% ***     14% ° 24%    100% *** 
   Party organizer     30% ***       0% ***         0% ***        17% ***       0% ** 0% 




      4% *** 
 
       19% *** 
 
       28% *** 
 




N 175 236 487  37 68 5 
 




Appendix D demonstrates that ministerial staffers are robustly more experienced within the public 
sector and more likely to be policy experts.  
In the Netherlands, the party in parliament benefits from a qualitative staffing advantage. Dutch 
parliamentary staffers stand out for their education and their tasks. Although staffers are generally 
highly-educated, the proportion of parliamentary staffers with a college degree is significantly 
higher. The qualitative advantage of the party in parliament is also illustrated by the large presence of 
policy experts. Although Dutch central offices also include staffers working on policy, they are 
significantly more prevalent in parliamentary offices. Moreover, only a small number of Dutch 
parliamentary staffers are involved in traditional bureaucratic tasks. Although it is not surprising 
that party organizers are concentrated within parties’  central offices, very few parliamentary staffers 
offer administrative and logistical support.  
However, the qualitative advantage of Dutch parliamentary offices is not absolute either. Firstly, 
the qualitative advantage of the party in parliament is tempered by their limited professional 
experience. Although this relative lack of professional experience is similar to other party faces, 
only a small minority of parliamentary staffers have substantial experience outside politics. 
Compared to central – and ministerial offices, Dutch parliamentary offices especially include few 
staffers with experience in the public sector. However, these differences between party faces are 
not statistically significant. Secondly, the qualitative advantage of the party in government is tempered 
by the lack of a communication advantage. Although insignificant, communication experts are 
nonetheless more numerous at parties’ central offices. However, these nuances do not neutralize 
the staffing advantage of parliamentary offices. The regression analysis in Appendix D 
demonstrates that the low presence of administration – and support staffers is a robust finding. 
However, the educational advantage of parliamentary staffers dissipates when controlling for the 
low presence of lower-educated administration – and support staffers. Lastly, the estimate 
indicating the stronger presence of policy experts is positive but insignificant. Compared to 
Belgium, the contrasts between staffers’ qualifications appear relatively limited in the Netherlands. 
However, the  lack of significant results is linked to a substantially lower number of observations 
from the Netherlands (Table 2).  
Institutional setting 
To examine how staffing is shaped by the institutional structure of the party in government (RQ2), I 
examine the impact of ministerial offices on parties’ internal distribution of staff. Of course, 
ministerial offices can only affect parties when they participate in government. Figure 4 illustrates 
how government participation can strongly impact staffing in parties. While ministerial offices only 























have a marginal impact on Dutch party organizations, Belgian ministerial offices strongly reduce 
the relative weight of central – and parliamentary offices. For this reason, government – and 
opposition parties are analyzed separately in this section. The combined effect of the quantitative 
(staff size) – and qualitative distribution (education, professional experience and tasks) of staff are 
discussed in detail for each party face (e.g. central offices of Belgian opposition parties) to situate 
their position on each dimension (Figure 5).  
The bivariate analyses listed in Tables 3 and 4 show that the combined effect of staff size and 
staffers’ qualifications often leads to a double advantage. At the bottom of the table, the 
quantitative distribution of staffers is shown. For example, 65% of all staffers from Dutch 
opposition parties work within parliamentary offices. The tables also show how staffers with certain 
qualifications are distributed across party faces. More specifically, figure 4 visualizes how staffers 
with certain tasks are distributed within parties. In Dutch opposition parties for example, 94% of 
all policy experts work within parliamentary offices – leaving only 6% of this important group to 
central offices. The significance test signals a double staffing advantage: parliamentary offices 
include even more policy experts (94%) than expected based on their relative staff size (65%). 
Hence, the quantitative advantage of the party in parliament is amplified by an advantage in policy 
expertise. In the following paragraphs, the combined effect of staff size and staffers’ qualifications 
will be discussed in more detail.  
The results demonstrate that the balance between party faces is strongly affected by the political 
system and a party’s governing status.  In Dutch opposition parties, the party in parliament benefits 
from a double staffing advantage. Firstly, its relative staff size substantially exceeds that off the 
party in central office. Secondly, this quantitative advantage is amplified by the qualifications of 
parliamentary staffers. Both party faces are each other’s mirror image. In parliament, staffers 
without higher education are underrepresented and college-educated staffers are even more 
prevalent than expected based on staff size. The level of education among central office staffers 
shows the opposite effect. While parliamentary offices include the majority of staffers with 
extensive experience in party politics and the private sector, this unequal distribution reflects their 
relative staff size. When staffers tasks are concerned, however, the quantitative staffing advantage 
of the party in parliament is amplified by a qualitative advantage. While the distribution of policy 
experts strongly benefits parliamentary offices, party organizers and supporting staff are heavily 








 GOVERNMENT  
(N=99) 
  Central Office Parliament  Central Office Parliament Ministerial Office 
 
Education    
 
   
   No higher education     80% *    20% *       75% **    25% * 0% 
   Higher, non-college education 50% 50%  46% 55% 0% 
   College degree 
 
    19% ** 
 
     81% ** 
 
      24% ** 
 





Professional experience   
 
   
   Party politics 30% 70%  30% 60% 10% 
   Public sector 50% 50%  25% 50% 25% 
   Private sector  20% 80%  43% 43% 14% 
 
Tasks 
    
 
      
   Manager 33% 67%  17% 83% 0% 
   Policy expert         6% ***       94% ***  27% 73% 0% 
   Communication expert 50% 50%  29% 71% 0% 
   Political assistant 33% 67%     17% * 61%     22% ** 
   Party organizer  100% *     0% *     100% **      0% * 0% 
   Administration & support 
 
  75% ° 
 
   25% ° 
 
       88% *** 
 




ALL 35% 65%  34% 59% 7% 
 




In Dutch government parties, the party in parliament again benefits from a double staffing 
advantage. Firstly, the party in parliament clearly remains the party face with the largest staff – in 
spite of losing some of its relative weight to ministerial offices. Secondly, its staffers remain the 
most highly qualified of all party faces. For starters, parliamentary staffers are significantly more 
qualified than their colleagues at central offices. Parliamentary offices include even more highly 
educated staffers than suggested by their staff size. The opposite applies to their colleagues at 
central offices, where the group of lower-educated staffers is disproportionally high. Most 
experienced staffers are concentrated within parliament, which aligns with the quantitative 
advantage of the parliamentary party. Furthermore, parliamentary offices include significantly less 
staffers involved in party organization and administration and support – staff types that are strongly 
concentrated within central offices. Although the group of Dutch ministerial staffers appear too 
small to fundamentally challenge the staffing advantage of the party in parliament, the results show 
that they are qualified rather highly. All ministerial staffers have a college degree and they appear 
to punch above their weight when it comes to experience outside party politics – albeit not 
significant.  
In Belgian opposition parties, no single party face clearly benefits from a staffing advantage. Firstly, 
central offices have a tiny quantitative advantage. Secondly, the qualifications of both central – and 
parliamentary offices are ambiguous as they point to both advantages and disadvantages. On the 
one hand, parliamentary staffers are slightly more highly-educated and they include significantly  
less staffers in supporting roles. On the other hand, the group of communication experts are 
strongly concentrated within the party in central office. However, this particular qualitative 
advantage for central offices does not apply to policy experts, who are equally split between central 
– and parliamentary offices. The professional experience of staffers does not offer clarity, as the  
most experienced staffers appear to be distributed relatively evenly between the party in central 
office and the party in parliament.  
In Belgian government parties, the party in government benefits from a double staffing advantage. 
Firstly, the infamous ministerial cabinets undoubtedly have the largest staff. In fact, a clear majority 
of all staffers from Belgian government parties work in ministerial offices. Secondly, this 
quantitative advantage is amplified by the superior qualifications of their staff. Ministerial offices 
attract even more staffers with experience in the public – and private sector than suggested by their 
relative staff size. This adds even more weight to the fact that the majority of staffers with extensive 
professional experience work in ministerial offices. Moreover, the largest and most important 
group of policy experts are strongly concentrated within ministerial offices. Although they do not 










  Central Office Parliament  Central Office Parliament Ministerial Office 
 
Education  
      
   No higher education 61% 39%     24% *         4% ***    72% ° 
   Higher, non-college education 60% 40%  16% 19% 65% 
   College degree    47% °    53% °     14% °       23% *** 63% 
 
Professional experience 
      
   Party politics 47% 53%  17% 17% 66% 
   Public sector 46% 55%          4% ***         8% ***       88% *** 
   Private sector  56% 44%     10% ° 17% 73% ° 
 
Tasks 
    
 
      
   Manager 50% 50%  18% 16% 67% 
   Policy expert 44% 57%         7% ***       13% ***       80% *** 
   Communication expert     82% **     18% **      26% **        7% ** 66% 
   Political assistant      16% ***       84% ***    10% °        73% ***       18% *** 
   Party organizer    100% ***         0% ***      100% ***        0% **         0% *** 
   Administration & support 
 
   81% ** 
 




        4% *** 
 
      81% *** 
 
ALL 52% 48% 
 
16% 19% 65% 
 




made. Parliamentary staffers are slightly higher educated than suggested by their relative staff size. 
Nonetheless, a clear majority of highly educated staffers are concentrated within ministerial 
cabinets. A similar pattern can be observed concerning communication experts. Although the share 
of communication experts at central offices is disproportionally high, most of these communication 
experts work in ministerial offices. Finally, a significantly large share of administration and support 
staffers work in ministerial offices.  
These findings largely align with the hypotheses presented in the theory section. Figure 5 illustrates 
the position of central offices (CPO), parliamentary offices (PPG) and ministerial offices (MO) on 
both dimensions, split up by country (BE: Belgium; NL: Netherlands) and governing status (Opp: 
opposition; Gov: government). Central office staffers are overshadowed by their colleagues in 
parliamentary – and ministerial offices – except in Belgian opposition parties. This partially 
supports the first hypothesis, which stated that the staff of parties’ public offices is both larger and 
more qualified than the staff of central offices (H1). Indeed, Dutch parliamentary offices are 
dominant professional machines with an extensive, highly qualified staff. In contrast, Dutch central 
offices neatly fit into the back-office category as their staff is both relatively small and less qualified. 
This image hardly changes when parties participate in government.  
 




Staffing patterns in Belgium substantially diverge from the Dutch situation. This finding suggests 
that parties’ internal distribution of staff is indeed shaped by institutional factors. In the 
Netherlands, the party in parliament permanently dominates and a party’s governing status has little 
effect on staffing (H2c). Ministerial offices do not fundamentally affect parties internal balance: the 
party in parliament does not lose its quantitative nor its qualitative staffing advantage. The 
comparatively high degree of experience and education among Dutch ministerial staffers suggests 
that ministerial offices are tiny expert cells – but the number observations is too small to yield 
significant results. In Belgium, however, government participation dramatically alters staffing 
patterns because ministerial offices are professional machines with large, highly qualified staffs 
(H2a). These dominant ministerial offices overshadow central – and parliamentary offices alike. 
Central offices in Belgian government parties act as back-offices with smaller, less-qualified staffs. 
The position of parliamentary offices is somewhere between back-office and expert cell because 
their staff is smaller but only slightly more qualified. Staffing in Belgian opposition parties is even 
more ambiguous as the staffs of central – and parliamentary offices are nearly equal and qualitative 
indicators yield mixed results. 
Conclusion 
This paper examined the internal power balance of parties by studying the distribution of their 
human resources. While earlier research suggests that parties’ parliamentary offices have a 
quantitative staffing advantage (Krouwel, 2012; Kölln, 2015; Bardi et al., 2017), I have argued that 
elected elites in parliament and government also benefit from a qualitative staffing advantage. Based 
on Panebianco’s seminal work (1988), I have argued that the demand for highly qualified staff is 
higher in parliamentary – and ministerial offices because elected elites are more vulnerable to 
challenges in the electoral – and policy arena. As a result, both the party in parliament and the party 
in government were expected to benefit from a qualitative staffing advantage as their staffs are more 
qualified. The results confirm that the individual qualifications of staffers in parliamentary – and 
ministerial offices are often superior to central office staffers. 
The differences between Belgium and the Netherlands demonstrate how institutional arrangements 
can shape parties’ internal distribution of resources. Although both political systems share many 
similarities, the support structure of governments is substantially different due to the size of 
ministerial offices. While Dutch ministers only have a handful political advisors at their disposal, 
their Belgian counterparts rely on extensive ‘ministerial cabinets’ containing dozens of politically 




is the main beneficiary of the double staffing advantage – combining both the largest and most 
qualified staff. The Dutch cause neatly reflects the conventional view on the power balance 
between party faces: the party in parliament clearly benefits from a double staffing advantage. 
Moreover, government participation does not substantially alter parties’ internal distribution of 
resources because ministerial offices include few political staffers. The Belgian case challenges this 
dominant image as the party in government benefits from a double staffing advantage. Although 
ministerial offices can become semi-permanent power centers within parties that frequently 
participate in government, party organizations are in constant flux as their human resources are 
strongly dependent on government participation.  
This unequal distribution of human resources affects parties’ internal power balance. As staffing 
patterns favor the elected elites in parliament and government, they undermine the capacity of 
extra-parliamentary parties to keep track of their elected representatives. In both Belgium and The 
Netherlands, controlling the actions of elected elites in parliament and government is an uphill 
battle for extra-parliamentary party organizations. As parliamentary – and ministerial staffers are 
more qualified, their expertise puts them one step ahead of their peers at central offices. However, 
it remains unclear whether shifting in resources (including staff) are responsible for the dominance 
of elected elites or vice versa. As longitudinal data are lacking, it is just as plausible that the 
dominance of elected elites actually preceded staff growth, enabling public offices to divert 
important resources towards themselves. Moreover, intra-party power dynamics should not be 
reduced to distribution of resources. They are just one piece of the puzzle that makes up parties’ 
internal power balance. In fact, research shows that central party organizations can remain 
dominant by controlling leadership positions and statutory prerogatives despite the growth of 
resources in parliamentary – and ministerial offices (Koskimaa, 2020). Similarly, the Belgian case 
demonstrates that the dominance of the party in public office is not inevitable – even in a political 
system where parties are highly dependent on public funding (Van Biezen and Kopecký, 2014). 
Despite the lack of a staffing advantage, central offices are nonetheless considered as the main 
political power houses within the Belgian partitocracy (Deschouwer et al., 1996) and parliamentary 
party groups remain subordinate to both central – and ministerial offices (De Winter and Dumont, 
2006; De Winter and Dumont, 2003).  
The contrasts between Belgium and the Netherlands are relevant for other countries where 
ministerial advisors are prominent actors (Shaw and Eichbaum, 2018). Despite the idiosyncrasies 
of the Belgian case, the staffing advantage of the party in government is unlikely to be an international 
aberration. Parties’ internal staff distribution can be expected to favor the party in government more 




advantage of Belgian ministerial offices shows how ongoing experiments with cabinetisation in 
Australia, Canada and Sweden (Gouglas and Brans, 2017) might affect political parties internally. 
The findings even suggest that the existence of ministerial cabinets influences the careers of those 
who work in politics. Compared to the Netherlands, Belgian parties include more older and 
experienced staffers and rely more on policy experts. The extensive ministerial offices are likely 
responsible for these contrasts. Belgian ministerial staffers often pursue careers at the crossroads 
between politics and administration (Brans et al., 2005), resulting in higher levels of experience in 
the public sector and the availability of policy experts. Moreover, the extensive size of ministerial 
offices creates many career opportunities, which enables more staffers to pursue a career in party 
politics as a ‘separate occupational track’ (Katz and Mair, 2009). 
References 
Allern EH, Bale, T. (2012) Political parties and interest groups: Distangling complex relations. Party 
Politics 18: 7-25. 
Andeweg R and Irwin G. (2009) Governance and Politics of the Netherlands: Palgrave macmillan. 
Bardi L, Calossi E and Pizzimenti E. (2017) Which Face Comes First? The Ascendancy of the Party 
in Public Office. In: scarrow S, webb P and Poguntke T (eds) Organizing Political Parties. 
Representation, Participation, and Power. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Blumenthal S. (1980) The Permanent Campaign: Inside the World of Elite Political Operations: Beacon Press 
(MA). 
Bolleyer N. (2009) Inside the Cartel Party: Party Organisation in Government and Opposition. 
Political Studies 57: 559-579. 
Brans M, Aubin, D. (2017) Policy analysis in Belgium. Bristol: Policy Press, 319. 
Brans M, Pelgrims C and Hoet D. (2005) Politico-administrative relations under coalition 
governments: the case of Belgium. Coalitions of the unwilling: politicians and civil servants in 
coalition governments, Bratislava: NISPAcee: 207-235. 
Brans M, Pelgrims C and Hoet D. (2006) Comparative observations on tensions between 
professional policy advice and political control in the Low Countries. International Review of 
Administrative Sciences 72: 57-71. 
Brante T. (1990) Professional types as a strategy of analysis. London: Sage Publications, 75-93. 
Busby A and Belkacem K. (2013) 'Coping with the Information Overload': An Exploration of 
Assistants' Backstage Role in the Everyday Practice of European Parliament Politics. 
Calcagno PT and Montgomery MM. (2020) The gender wage gap: an analysis of US congressional 
staff members. Public Choice: 1-19. 
Connaughton B. (2015) Navigating the borderlines of politics and administration: Reflections on 
the role of ministerial advisers. International Journal of Public Administration 38: 37-45. 
De Vries CE and Hobolt SB. (2020) Political entrepreneurs: the rise of challenger parties in Europe: 
Princeton University Press. 
De Winter L and Brans M. (2003) Belgium: political professionals and the crisis of the party state. 




De Winter L and Dumont P. (2003) Belgium: delegation and accountability under partitocratic rule 
In: Strøm K, Müller WC and Bergman T (eds) Delegation and accountability in parliamentary 
democracies. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 253-280. 
De Winter L and Dumont P. (2006) Do Belgian Parties Undermine the Democratic Chain of 
Delegation? West European Politics 29: 957-976. 
DeGregorio C. (1988) Professionals in the U. S. Congress: An Analysis of Working Styles. Legislative 
Studies Quarterly 13: 459-476. 
Deschouwer K. (2009) The politics of Belgium: governing a divided society, Basingstoke: Palgrave 
Macmillan. 
Deschouwer K, De Winter L and Della Porta D. (1996) Partitocracies between crises and reforms: 
the cases of Italy and Belgium. RES PUBLICA 38: 215-494. 
Drummond AJ. (2006) Electoral volatility and party decline in Western democracies: 1970–1995. 
Political Studies 54: 628-647. 
Erikson J and Verge T. (2020) Gender, Power and Privilege in the Parliamentary Workplace. 
Parliamentary Affairs. 
Gibson R and Harmel R. (1998) Party families and democratic performance: extraparliamentary vs. 
parliamentary group power. Political Studies 46: 633-650. 
Gouglas A and Brans M. (2017) Crossing the Rubicon. The Cabinetisation of the Minister’s Court 
in Australia and Canada. Has the Die Been Cast? International Conference on Public Policy, 
Location: Singapore. 
Gouglas A, Brans M and Jaspers S. (2015) Political Advisers and Policy Making in Ministerial 
Cabinet Systems: the case of Belgium, Greece & the European Commission. International 
Conference on Public Policy, Date: 2015/07/01-2015/07/04, Location: Milan. 
Heidar Ke and Wauters BePS. (2019) Do parties still represent? An analysis of the representativeness of 
political parties in western democracies: London Routledge 2019. 
Hertel-Fernandez A, Mildenberger M and Stokes LC. (2018) Legislative Staff and Representation 
in Congress. American Political Science Review 113: 1-18. 
Hopkin J and Paolucci C. (1999) The business firm model of party organisation: Cases from Spain 
and Italy. European Journal of Political Research 35: 307-339. 
Jun U and Bukow S. (2020) Party Democracies in Europe Under Threat? Continuity and Change of 
Party Democracies in Europe. Springer, 1-27. 
Karlsen R and Saglie J. (2017) Party bureaucrats, independent professionals, or politicians? A study 
of party employees. West European Politics: 1-21. 
Katz R and Mair P. (1993) The Evolution of Party Organizations in Europe: The Three Faces of 
Party Organization. The American Review of Politics 14: 593-617. 
Katz R and Mair P. (1995) Changing Models of Party Organisation and Party Democracy: The 
Emergence of the Cartel Party. Party Politics 1: 5-28. 
Katz R and Mair P. (2002) The Ascendancy of the Party in Public Office: Party Organizational 
Change in Tweentieth-Century Democracies. In: Gunther R, Montero JR and Linz JJ (eds) 
Political Parties: Old Concepts and New Challenges. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 113-135. 
Katz R and Mair P. (2009) The Cartel Party Thesis: A Restatement. Perspectives on Politics 7: 753-766. 
Kircheimer O. (1966) The Transformation of the Western European Party Systems. In: 
LaPalombara J and Weiner M (eds) Political parties and political development. Princeton: 




Kölln A-K. (2015) The effects of membership decline on party organisations in Europe. European 
Journal of Political Research 54: 707-725. 
Koskimaa V. (2020) The ‘genetic’effect: Can parties’ past organizational choices condition the 
development of their internal distribution of power in the cartel party era? Evidence from 
Finland, 1983–2017. Politics: 0263395720901422. 
Krouwel A. (2012) Party transformations in European democracies, New York: State University of New 
York Press. 
Loxbo K. (2013) The fate of intra-party democracy: Leadership autonomy and activist influence in 
the mass party and the cartel party. Party Politics 19: 537-554. 
Maley M. (2000) Conceptualising Advisers' Policy Work: The Distinctive Policy Roles of Ministerial 
Advisers in the Keating Government, 1991–96. Australian Journal of Political Science 35: 449-
470. 
Marks G, Hooghe L and Blank K. (1996) European Integration from the 1980s: State-Centric v. 
Multi-level Governance. JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies 34: 341-378. 
McAllister I. (2007) The personalization of politics, Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
McCrain J. (2018) revolving door Lobbyists and the value of Congressional staff Connections. The 
Journal of Politics 80: 1369-1383. 
Moens P. (2020) Professional Partisans. Party activism among political Staffers in Party 
Democracies. Ghent. 
Ng Y-F. (2018) The Rise of Political Advisors in the Westminster System: Routledge. 
Ongaro E and Peters BG. (2008) The napoleonic tradition. International Journal of Public Sector 
Management. 
Painter M and Peters BG. (2010) Administrative traditions in comparative perspective: Families, 
groups and hybrids. Tradition and public administration. Springer, 19-30. 
Panebianco A. (1988) Political parties: organization and power, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Parke CS. (2012) Essential first steps to data analysis: Scenario-based examples using SPSS: Sage 
Publications. 
Passarelli G. (2015) The presidentialization of political parties: Organizations, institutions and leaders: 
Springer. 
Patterson SC. (1970) The professional staffs of congressional committees. Administrative Science 
Quarterly: 22-37. 
Pegan A. (2017) The role of personal parliamentary assistants in the European Parliament. West 
European Politics 40: 295-315. 
Poguntke T and Webb PD. (2007) The presidentialization of politics: A comparative study of modern 
democracies, Oxford: Oxford University Press  
Rahat G and Kenig O. (2018) From party politics to personalized politics?: party change and political 
personalization in democracies: Oxford University Press. 
Salisbury RH and Shepsle KA. (1981) Congressional Staff Turnover and the Ties-That-Bind. The 
American Political Science Review 75: 381-396. 
Schlesinger JA. (1984) On the theory of party organization. The Journal of Politics 46: 368-400. 
Shaw R and Eichbaum C. (2018) Ministers, Minders and Mandarins: An International Study of Relationships 
at the Executive Summit of Parliamentary Democracies: Edward Elgar Publishing. 
Snagovsky F and Kerby M. (2018) Political Staff and the Gendered Division of Political Labour in 




Stone D, Denham A and Garnett M. (1998) Think tanks across nations: A comparative approach: 
Manchester University Press. 
Svallfors S. (2017) Knowing the game: motivations and skills among partisan policy professionals. 
Journal of Professions and Organization 4: 55-69. 
Taflaga M and Kerby M. (2019) Who Does What Work in a Ministerial Office: Politically 
Appointed Staff and the Descriptive Representation of Women in Australian Political 
Offices, 1979–2010. Political Studies 0: 0032321719853459. 
Van Biezen I. (2000) On the internal balance of party power: party organizations in new 
democracies. Party Politics 6: 395-417. 
Van Biezen I and Kopecký P. (2014) The cartel party and the state Party–state linkages in European 
democracies. Party Politics 20: 170-182. 
Van Biezen I and Poguntke T. (2014) The decline of membership-based politics. Party Politics 20: 
205-216. 
Webb P and Fisher J. (2003) Professionalism and the Millbank tendency: The political sociology of 
New Labour's employees. Politics 23: 10-20. 
Webb P and Keith D. (2017) Assessing the Strength of Party Organizational Resources: A Survey 
of the Evidence from the Political Party Database. In: Scarrow S, Webb P and Poguntke T 
(eds) Organizing Political Parties. Representation, Participation, and Power. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. 
Webb P and Kolodny R. (2006) Professional staff in political parties. In: Katz RS and Crotty W 
(eds) Handbook of Party Politics. London: Sage, 337-347. 
Wilson RP. (2020) The work of Canadian political staffers in parliamentary caucus research offices. 
Canadian Public Administration 63: 498-521. 
 















N-VA Belgium Conservative 20% 560 Government 32% November 2018 - January 2019 
CD&V Belgium Christian-Democratic 12% 521 Government 33% December 2018 – March 2019  
PS Belgium Socialist 12% 565 Opposition 29% February 2019 - April 2019 
VLD Belgium Liberal 10% 417 Government 37% December 2018 - March 2019 
Sp.a Belgium Socialist 9% 192 Opposition 34% November 2018 – May 2019 
Groen Belgium Green 5% 91 Opposition 45% January 2019 - March 2019 
PVDA-PTB Belgium Radical Left 4% 65 Opposition 38% January 2019 - April 2019 
Ecolo Belgium Green 3% 104 Opposition 46% March 2019 – April 2019 
Défi Belgium Liberal 2% 103 Opposition 19% March 2019 – April 2019 
VVD Netherlands Liberal 21% 107 Government 51% October 2019 -  December 2019 
D66 Netherlands Liberal 12% 93 Government 47% September 2019 - November 2019 
PvdA Netherlands Socialist 6% 62 Opposition 48% September 2019 - January 2020 
50Plus Netherlands Liberal 3% 27 Opposition 22% October 2019 -  November 2019 
SGP Netherlands Conservative 2% 29 Opposition 48% December 2019 




Appendix B. Variables 
B.1. DEPENDENT VARIABLE 
 
 Central office Parliament Ministerial office TOTAL 
Belgium 228 252 380 860 
The Netherlands 59 85 5 149 
TOTAL 287 337 385 1009 
 
B.2. INDEPENDENT VARIABLES 
B.2.1. Education by party face 
 





Staffers’ individual tasks 
Managers Director (central office, ministerial office), party group secretary, head of general 
policy (ministerial office), cabinet secretary (ministerial office) 
Policy experts Policy advice (party study service, party group or ministerial office) 
Communication 
experts 
Director of communications, communication cell staff, spokesperson, internal 
party communication staff, translator, public relations staff 
Political assistants Personal assistant, parliamentary liaison (ministerial office) 
Party organizers Coach of local sections/campaigns, experts in local policy, assistants to party 
subgroups (youth, women, elderly, ...)  
Administration  
& support 
Finance and accounting, human resources, IT, reception, administration, 
catering, personal driver  
 








Appendix C. Control variables 
C.1. Age 
C.1.2. Age by country 
 
 Belgium Netherlands Total Sig. 
Meana 42 36 41 *** 
Median 40 32,5 39  
18-35b 34% 60% 37% *** 
36-50b 40% 25% 39% ** 
50+b 26% 16% 25% * 
N  898  110  1008   
 a: Independent samples T-test; b: Adjusted standardized residuals  
 
Age distribution by country, X-axis from 18 to 65. 
Light gray area: Belgium, dark gray area: The Netherlands 
C.1.2. Age by party face 
Central office 
 
Age distribution by party face, X-axis from 18 to 65 




Age distribution by party face, X-axis from 18 to 65 
Light gray area: general distribution, dark gray area: parliamentary office  
 
Ministerial office  
 
Age distribution by party face, X-axis from 18 to 65 
Light gray area: general distribution, dark gray area: ministerial office  
 
 
C.2. Gender  
 
C.2.1. Gender by country 
 
 Belgium Netherlands Total Sig. 
Male 58% 53% 57% - 
Female 42% 47% 43% - 
N 898 110 1008 
 
Sig. test: Chi-square, Adj. standardized residuals 
 
 





























 Central office Parliament Ministerial office 
 
Central office Parliament 
 
Education (Ref. cat. No higher education) 
      
   Higher, non-college education   0,84 (0,39)  3,18 (0,49) *  0,61 (0,35)  1,09 (1,26)  1,30 (1,16) 
   College degree   0,70 (0,38) 3,98 (0,46) ***    0,55 (0,34) °  0,17 (1,12)  3,09 (1,03) 
 
Professional experience       
   Party politics   0,76 (0,30) 1,81 (0,27) * 0,78 (0,23)  0,21 (1,26)  1,80 (0,94) 
   Public sector 0,19 (0,45) ***    0,33 (0,35) ***       4,93 (0,29) ***  4,66 (1,29)  0,14 (1,28) 
   Private sector    0,85 (0,38)     1,52 (0,37) 0,85 (0,30)  0,56 (1,46)  0,58 (1,18) 
 
Tasks (Ref. cat. Manager)       
   Policy expert       0,35 (0,39) **      0,81 (0,36)      2,16 (0,32) **  0,27 (1,44)  1,55 (1,42) 
   Communication expert  1,71 (0,41)      0,36 (0,49) * 1,08 (0,36)  0,78 (1,40)  0,52 (1,41) 
   Political assistant       0,29 (0,46) **  17,42 (0,41) *** 0,09 (0,41)  0,22 (1,41)  0,63 (1,35) 
   Party organizer 5E+9 (5991) 0,00 (5955)  0,00 (5935)  2E+9 (15387)   0,0 (16102) 
   Administration & support  0,95 (0,45)      0,45 (0,52) 1,42 (0,39)      34,84 (1,90)  °      0,02 (1,92) * 
Controls       
   Age   1,00 (0,01) 0,99 (0,01) 1,01 (0,01)  0,97 (0,04)  1,03 (0,04) 
   Sex (Ref. cat. Male)       
       Female   0,93 (0,23) 0,75 (0,22) 1,28 (0,19)  0,87 (0,64)  1,92 (0,57) 
Constant   0,60 (0,76)     0,11 (0,82) ** 1,22 (0,64)  9,67 (1,98)  0,41 (1,88) 
Nagelkerke R2 0,40 0,46 0,43  0,55 0,48 
Note: Odd’s ratios (SE’s) of separate binary logistic regressions; ° p ≤ .1, * p ≤ .05, ** p ≤ .01, *** p ≤ .001 














Education (Ref. cat. No higher education)      
 
   Higher, non-college education    3,34 (0,64) °     2,93 (0,41) **    2,24 (0,38) * 1,51 (0,35)    0,40 (0,57) °       0,28 (0,28) *** 
   College degree  4,66 (0,60) ** 14,31 (0,38) *** 1,06 (0,36) 1,02 (0,31) 0,56 (0,42)       0,04 (0,30) *** 
 
Professional experience       
   Party politics   2,17 (0,30) **     1,04 (0,20) 0,89 (0,29) 0,80 (0,26)   0,48 (0,42) ° 1,15 (0,29) 
   Public sector    0,57 (0,37)    2,99 (0,23) *** 0,65 (0,34) 0,62 (0,31)     0,10 (0,81) ** 0,98 (0,30) 
   Private sector     1,02 (0,42)     1,13 (0,28) 1,41 (0,36) 0,87 (0,36)   0,32 (0,63) ° 1,25 (0,33) 
 
Controls       
   Age 1,06 (0,02) ***     1,00 (0,01)    0,98 (0,01) °      0,97 (0,01) ** 1,03 (0,02) 1,01 (0,01) 
   Sex (Ref. cat. Male)       
       Female    1,07 (0,27)   0,60 (0,15) *** 0,87 (0,21) 1,19 (0,18) 1,33 (0,30)    1,75 (0,23) * 
 
















Note: Odd’s ratios (SE’s) of multiple logistic regressions; ° p ≤ .1, * p ≤ .05, ** p ≤ .01, *** p ≤ .001 
